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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 900057-CA 
v. : 
STANLEY MALSTROM, : Priority Two 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
B R I E F O F A P P E L L E E 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of practicing medicine 
without a license, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-12-30 (Supp. 1988). Defendant was convicted 
following a bench trial in Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction in this case pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990) and Rule 26(2)(a), Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Whether defendant, who voluntarily chose to 
represent himself at trial, is entitled to be held to a lesser 
standard of competency than would otherwise be required. There 
has been no clearly articulated standard of review by Utah 
courts. As a general rule, a party who represents himself will 
be held to the same standard as a member of the bar* Nelson v. 
Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983). 
2. Whether the evidence is sufficient to establish 
defendant's conviction for practicing medicine without a license. 
The standard of review to be applied following a bench trial is 
whether the trial court's determination of guilt was clearly 
erroneous, i.e., against the clear weight of the evidence, or 
whether this Court reaches a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 
1987). 
3. Whether the state was required to affirmatively 
prove that none of the exemptions in the Medical Practice Act's 
prohibition against practicing medicine without a license applied 
to defendant, or, alternatively, whether the trial court erred in 
determining that none of the exceptions was applicable to 
defendant under the facts of this case. See State v. Cox, 751 
P.2d 1152, 1153 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Reams v. State, 279 So.2d 
839, 843 (Fla. 1973). 
4. Whether defendant can argue that the statute which 
prohibits practicing medicine without a license, Utah Code Ann. § 
58-12-30 (Supp. 1988) is unconstitutionally overbroad. State v. 
Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502 (Utah 1987). 
5. Whether defendant preserved for appeal the trial 
court's decision to admit evidence concerning Mrs. Marshall's 
pain and subsequent surgery after having received treatment by 
defendant, or, alternatively, whether the admission of the 
evidence was in fact error. In reviewing this issue, this court 
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must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. 
Zions Corp. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), overruled 
on other grounds, McFarland v. Skaggs Co., Inc., 678 P.2d 298 
(Utah 1984) . 
6. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
refusing to grant defendant's post-trial motion for new trial in 
this case. The standard of review is whether the trial court 
clearly abused its discretion to the prejudice of the defendant. 
State v. Smith, 777 P.2d 464 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATES AND RULES 
In addition to the provisions quoted throughout this 
brief, the following provisions are provided: 
Dtah Code Ann. S 58-12-30 (Supp. 1988): 
It is unlawful to engage in the practice 
of medicine in this state without first 
obtaining a license. Any person who engages 
in the practice of medicine without a license 
is guilty of a felony; except the following 
persons may engage in activities included in 
the practice of medicine subject to the 
circumstances and limitations stated: 
(1) a medical officer of the armed forces 
, of the United States, of the United States 
Public Health Service, or of the Veterans 
Administration, while engaged in the 
performance of his official duties; 
(2) an individual residing in another 
state or country and authorized to practice 
medicine there, who is called in consultation 
by an individual licensed in this state or 
who, for the purpose of furthering education 
in the healing arts, is invited by a 
professional school approved by the division 
or by a state professional association of 
medical practitioners or by one of their 
component societies, to conduct a lecture, 
clinic, or demonstration, while engaged in 
activities in connection with the 
consultation, lecture, clinic, or 
demonstration, so long as he does not open an 
office or appoint a place to meet patients or 
receive calls within this state; 
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(3) an individual authorized to practice 
medicine in another state or country or a 
medical officer described in Subsection (1)# 
or an individual who has received the degree 
of doctor of medicine, while rendering 
medical care in a time of disaster or while 
caring for an ill or injured individual at 
the scene of an emergency and while 
continuing to care for the individual; 
(4) any individual rendering aid in an 
emergency, when no fee or other consideration 
of value for the service is contemplated, 
charged or received; 
(5) any individual administering a 
domestic or family remedy including those 
persons engaged in the sale of vitamins, 
health food or health food supplements, herb 
or other produces of nature, except drugs or 
medicines for which an authorized 
prescription is required by law; 
(6) a person engaged in good faith in the 
practice of the religious tenets of any 
church or religious belief without the use of 
any drugs or medicines for which an 
authorized prescription is required by law; 
(7) a person licensed under other laws of 
this state to practice dentistry or dental 
surgery, optometry, osteopathy, pharmacy, 
podiatry, chiropractic, naturopathy, physical 
therapy, nursing, psychology, or other 
licensed profession to the extent authorized 
by his license; 
(8) a student in training in a 
professional school approved by the division 
while performing the duties of an intern or 
similar function in a hospital under the 
supervision of its staff; 
(9) an individual appointed as an intern 
or accepted for specialty or residency 
training in a hospital approved by the 
division to the extent required by the duties 
of his position or by his program of training 
for a period of two years and for any 
additional periods the division, upon 
application, deems necessary and proper; 
(10) an individual who, after December 31, 
1951, was licensed by another state or 
country to practice medicine in that state or 
country or who received the degree of doctor 
of medicine from a medical college in good 
standing in the United States, the District 
of Columbia, or Canada or from a foreign 
medical college recognized by the educational 
commission for foreign medical graduates, and 
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has passed an examination given by the 
commission, and who is regularly employed by 
the University of Utah Medical School upon 
its full-time teaching staff, and for 
purposes of teaching only and while engaged 
in the performance of his duties so long as 
he does not open an office or appoint a place 
to meet private patients or receive calls 
within this state; 
(11) an individual authorized by the 
Department of Health under Section 26-1-30 
for the purpose of withdrawing blood to 
determine the alcoholic content pursuant to 
Section 41-6-44.10. 
Utah Code Ann. S 58-12-28(2) & (4) (Supp. 1988): 
(2) "Diagnose" means to examine in any 
manner another person, parts of a person's 
body, substance, fluids, or materials 
excreted, taken or removed from a person's 
body, or produced by a person's body, to 
determine the source, nature, kind, or extent 
of a disease or other physical or mental 
condition, or to attempt to so examine or to 
determine, or to hold oneself out or 
represent that an examination or 
determination is being made or to make an 
examination or determination upon or from 
information supplied directly or indirectly 
by another person, whether or not in the 
presence of the person making or attempting 
the diagnosis. 
. . . . 
(4) "Practice of medicine" means: 
(a) to diagnose, treat, correct, advise, or 
prescribe for any human disease, ailment, 
injury, infirmity, deformity, pain or other 
condition, physical or mental, real or 
imaginary, or to attempt to do so by any 
means or instrumentality; 
(b) to maintain an office or place of 
business for the purpose of doing any of the 
acts described in Subsection (4)(a) whether 
or not for compensation; 
(c) to use, in the conduct of any 
occupation or profession pertaining to the 
diagnosis or treatment of human diseases or 
conditions in any printed material, 
stationery, letterhead, envelopes, signs, 
advertisements, the designation "doctor," 
"doctor of medicine," "physician," "surgeon," 
"physician and surgeon," "Dr.," "M.D.," or 
any combination of these designations, unless 
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the designation additionally contains the 
description of the branch of the healing arts 
for which the person has a license. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On August 31, 1989, defendant, Stanley Malstrom, was 
found guilty of practicing medicine without a license, a third 
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-30 (Supp. 
1988). On motion of defendant, the jury was waived and the case 
tried to the bench in Third District Court, Judge Timothy R. 
Hanson presiding. On October 24, 1989, defendant's motion for 
new trial was heard by the court; defendant was represented by 
counsel. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant was 
sentenced to up to five years in the Utah State Prison and fined 
$5,000; the sentence was stayed and he was placed on probation 
for eighteen months with all but $3,000 of the fine suspended. 
Defendant filed a notice of appeal on November 22, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On October 29, 1988, defendant, Stanley Malstrom 
examined and treated Carol Marshall of Spanish Fork, Utah, for 
unspecified "digestive problems" (T. 11). Defendant was not 
licensed to practice medicine in the State of Utah (T. 9). 
The examination and treatment took place at defendant's 
Midvale, Utah, home at approximately 7:30 p.m. (T. 11). Mrs. 
Marshall was accompanied to defendant's home by her husband, Rex 
Marshall, and two friends, Deryl and Bernice Tischner (T. 11). 
The trial transcript is entered in the record at page 86 and the 
sentencing transcript at page 87. Hereinafter cites to the trial 
transcript are labeled (T. ) and cites to the sentencing 
transcript are labeled (ST. ). All other cites to the record 
are labeled (R. ). 
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Mr. and Mrs. Tischner had recommended defendant and had 
arranged the appointment for Mrs. Marshall (T. 14). Defendant 
had agreed to see Mrs. Marshall on an evening during his vacation 
because that was the only time she and her husband could travel 
to Midvale for an appointment (T. 32). Mr. and Mrs. Tischner had 
previously sent numerous other patients to defendant, including 
members of their own family (T. 33). 
Defendant led Mr. and Mrs. Marshall and Mr. and Mrs. 
Tischner into an "examining room" in his home (T. 12-13). 
Defendant instructed Mrs. Marshall to lay down on top of an 
"oblong-shaped table with padding on top" which appeared to be an 
examining table (T. 13, 43). Although defendant never 
represented himself to her as a medical doctor, Mrs. Marshall was 
under the impression that he was a doctor of internal medicine 
(T. 21-22), and she had gone to see defendant for "digestive 
problems" (T. 14). Mr. Marshall specifically told defendant that 
Mrs. Marshall had digestive problems and had undergone surgery 
for a hiatal hernia (T. 44). Defendant responded that he wished 
she had come to him first so she could have avoided the surgery 
(T. 44). 
Defendant proceeded to examine Mrs. Marshall, probing 
her stomach, her sternum, and her throat with his hands (T. 14, 
44). Defendant then instructed Mrs. Marshall to sit upright on 
the table. He took hold of her esophagus, which he called her 
"rattling chain," and shook it (T. 15). Upon completion of his 
examination, defendant concluded that Mrs. Marshall had Ma messed 
up pancreas" (T. 15, 22). 
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Defendant then had Mrs. Marshall roll over onto her 
stomach. As she rolled over, he took hold of her head and 
twisted her neck with a quick movement which caused her neck to 
produce a popping sound (T. 15, 45). The twisting motion caused 
Mrs. Marshall to feel severe pain in the back of her neck and 
down through her shoulders (T. 15). She feared that two of her 
vertebrae, which had been fused together in a surgical procedure 
several years prior, might have been separated (T. 15). 
After twisting Mrs. Marshall's neck, defendant then 
applied pressure on each of her hip joints (T. 16). When 
defendant finished and asked how she felt, Mrs. Marshall replied 
that she was in pain (T. 17). Defendant then applied pressure 
with his fingers to various points inside Mrs. Marshall's mouth 
to alleviate the pain, but each time he removed the pressure, the 
pain returned (T. 17). Because the pain was still present after 
pushing at points inside her mouth, defendant informed Mrs. 
Marshall that she probably had a sinus infection and should see 
her doctor (T. 18). Defendant then performed some spinal 
manipulation on Mrs. Marshall by pushing down on both sides of 
her spine, causing it to produce popping sounds (T. 18). 
After he finished manipulating Mrs. Marshall's spine, 
defendant then prescribed some dietary alterations, advising Mrs. 
Marshall to avoid certain types of foods (T. 18). He also 
instructed her to periodically take a "green drink," which was 
made of various vegetables, pineapple juice and cayenne pepper 
(T. 18). Finally, he instructed Mrs. Marshall to use a garlic 
enema (T. 23). 
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About a week following the treatment, Mrs. Marshall saw 
a physical therapist who noted that she had marked pain and 
muscle spasms (T. 25-26). She also had swelling in her neck and 
shoulders and pain and numbness in her arms. Mrs. Marshall 
subsequently underwent surgery for a herniated disc at the C5-6 
level of her vertebrae (T. 19, 20, 25, 29). The new injury was 
about three-fourths of an inch from the location of a prior disc 
fusion (T. 30). Mrs. Marshall explained that she had not told 
defendant about the prior back surgery because she had gone to 
see him only for digestive problems (T. 14). 
David Fairhurst is the keeper of the licensing records 
for the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing for 
the Department of Commerce (T. 8-9). His review of the records 
established that defendant was not licensed to practice medicine 
in the State of Utah (T. 9). 
Following the trial, defendant was found guilty of 
practicing medicine without a license. Judge Hanson had urged 
defendant on at least two occasions leading up to trial to obtain 
an attorney (ST. 9). Nevertheless, defendant opted to represent 
himself in the trial. 
Sentencing was set for October 10, 1989, but on motion 
of defendant, was continued to October 24, 1989 to allow him to 
obtain an attorney (R. 50). On the date set for sentencing, the 
court heard and denied defendant's motion for new trial (R. 73). 
The court then sentenced defendant to up to five years in the 
Utah State Prison and imposed a fine of $5,000 (R. 74). The 
court stayed execution of the prison sentence and placed 
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defendant on eighteen months probation and suspended all but 
$3,000 of the fine (R. 74). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A litigant who chooses to represent himself at trial 
is, as a general rule, held to the same standard of competence as 
a member of the bar. 
The evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's 
guilt of practicing medicine without a license. 
The state was not required to affirmatively prove that 
defendant's conduct did not fall within one of the exemptions to 
the requirement that one be licensed to practice medicine. 
The statute that prohibits the practice of medicine 
without a license is not unconstitutionally overbroad. 
The trial court did not erroneously admit evidence of 
the circumstances surrounding defendant's treatment of Mrs. 
Marshall. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing to grant defendant's motion for new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO REPRESENT HIMSELF 
AT TRIAL; HAVING MADE THAT DECISION, HE IS TO 
BE HELD TO THE SAME STANDARD AS AN ATTORNEY. 
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right . . . to have the Assistance of counsel for his 
defence." Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution 
provides specifically that an accused has the right to self-
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representation: "In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have 
the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel . . . ." 
It is a basic principle of law that an accused in a 
criminal case may defend himself without counsel. However, since 
a pro se defendant relinquishes many of the benefits associated 
with counsel, an assertion of this right must be made "knowingly 
and intelligently." Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 
(1975). Defendant was informed by Judge Hanson on at least two 
occasions of the hazards involved in self-representation and the 
judge "urged" him to obtain an attorney (ST. 9). Defendant chose 
to proceed pro se. He now claims that he should not be held to 
the same stringent standard as a law-trained attorney. He claims 
that although his objections were inartful, this Court should 
consider them as having been made. 
In Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983), 
the Utah Supreme Court stated: "As a general rule, a party who 
represents himself will be held to the same standard of knowledge 
and practice as any qualified member of the bar." (Citations 
omitted.) The Court noted, however, that "[a]t the same time, we 
have also cautioned that 'because of his lack of technical 
knowledge of law and procedure, [a layman acting as his own 
attorney] should be accorded every consideration that may 
reasonably be indulged.'" JEd. (Second alteration in original.) 
However, "reasonable consideration" for a pro se litigant does 
not require the trial court to "interrupt the course of 
proceedings to translate legal terms, explain legal rules, or 
otherwise attempt to redress the ongoing consequences of the 
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party's decision to function in a capacity for which he is not 
trained." Ld. The legal system cannot function on a basis other 
than one of equal treatment for all litigants. See Mangiaracina 
v. Gutierrez, 730 P.2d 1109, 1111 (Kan. App. 1986). 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR PRACTICING 
MEDICINE WITHOUT A LICENSE. 
Defendant was convicted following a bench trial of 
practicing medicine without a license, a third degree felony in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-30 (Supp. 1988). This 
section of the Code, part of the Medical Practice Act, states in 
pertinent part: "It is unlawful to engage in the practice of 
medicine in this state without first obtaining a license. Any 
person who engages in the practice of medicine without a license 
is guilty of a felony . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-30 (Supp. 
1988). The practice of medicine is defined in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-12-28(4) (Supp. 1988) as meaning "to diagnose, treat, 
correct, advise, or prescribe for any human disease, ailment, 
injury, infirmity, deformity, pain or other condition, physical 
or mental, real or imaginary, or attempt to do so by any means or 
instrumentality." Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-28(4) (Supp. 1988). 
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting his conviction. The standard of review applied to 
bench trials when examining the sufficiency of the evidence is a 
clearly erroneous standard. "The trial court's findings, entered 
after a bench trial, will not be overturned unless they are 
clearly erroneous, i.e., against the clear weight of the 
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evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." State v. 
Wessendorf# 777 P.2d 523, 526 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citing State 
v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). See also State v. 
Fowler, 745 P.2d 472, 474-75 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
As the trial court noted, there are two elements the 
State was required to prove to convict defendant of practicing 
medicine without a license (T. 55). First, the state was 
required to prove that defendant's actions constituted the 
practice of medicine as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-28(4) 
(Supp. 1988). Second, the state was required to prove that at 
the time of the alleged behavior, defendant was not licensed to 
practice medicine in the State of Utah. 
There is no question as to the second element of the 
crime. David Fairhurst, Licensing Coordinator at the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing for the Department of 
Commerce, is the keeper of records for professional licensing for 
the State of Utah (T. 8). His review of the records established 
that defendant was not licensed to practice medicine in the State 
of Utah (T. 9). His testimony was uncontroverted, and the trial 
court properly found that element of the crime to be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The majority of the evidence at trial went to the first 
element of the crime. Mr. and Mrs. Marshall supplied ample 
evidence to convict defendant. And, as the trial court noted, 
even the testimony of the defense witnesses, Deryl and Bernice 
Tischner, did not refute, but was compatible with, the charges 
against defendant (T. 61). 
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Carol Marshall testified that Deryl Tischner 
recommended that she see the defendant regarding her "digestive 
problems" (T. 11, 33). Mr. Tischner arranged the "appointment" 
with defendant (T. 22, 32). And both Mr. and Mrs. Marshall and 
Mr. and Mrs. Tischner testified to various acts of defendant in 
his "examining room" or "office." (T. 10-24, 31-48). 
Defendant had Mrs., Marshall lie atop his examining 
table where he probed her abdomen, sternum and throat with his 
hands (T. 14-15, 43-44). Having done this, defendant diagnosed 
Mrs. Marshall as having "a messed up pancreas" (T. 15, 22, 43-
44). No testimony was offered denying or rebutting these facts. 
Defendant later informed Mrs. Marshall that she had a sinus 
infection after pain persisted when he stopped pressing on 
pressure points in her mouth (T. 18). Defendant's actions 
constituted "examin[ing] in any manner another person . . . to 
determine the source, nature, kind, or extent of a disease or 
other physical or mental condition, or [an] attempt to so 
examine . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-28(2) (Supp. 1988). 
Therefore, defendant "diagnosed" Mrs. Marshall within the meaning 
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-28(2) (Supp. 1988), and thus engaged in 
the "practice of medicine" as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-
28(4). 
Defendant attempts to establish that he did not 
diagnose Mrs. Marshall by citing to various sources which state 
that diagnosis requires recognition of a disease from symptoms 
observed. He further argues that he would have had to "NAME a 
disease" in order to have "diagnosed" Mrs. Marshall (Appellant's 
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Opening Brief at 11-12). However, defendant's reliance on Tabors 
Medical Encyclopedia is not helpful since the relevant definition 
of "diagnose" is defined by statute. Defendant cannot deny that 
his actions constituted a diagnosis by admitting that he was 
unable to name Mrs. Marshall's ailment, especially when § 58-12-
28(2) precludes "attempts" to diagnosis. Defendant examined 
Carol Marshall and diagnosed her, albeit crudely, as suffering 
from "a messed up pancreas," and as having a probable sinus 
infection. 
Defendant's diagnosis of Mrs. Marshall, in itself, is 
sufficient to support his conviction. But there was ample 
evidence that he also engaged in the practice of medicine by 
treating and advising Mrs. Marshall, or attempting to treat or 
advise her within the meaning of § 58-12-28(4)(a). 
After diagnosing Mrs. Marshall's "messed up pancreas," 
defendant shook her esophagus, which he called her "rattling 
chain" (T. 15). He positioned her on her side and applied 
pressure to each of her hips (T. 16). Mr. Marshall testified 
that defendant applied pressure to her sternum (T. 44). Both 
Mrs. and Mr. Marshall testified that defendant performed some 
kind of manipulation on her neck (T. 15, 45). This caused her 
neck to produce popping sounds and resulted in considerable pain 
(T. 15, 45). Bernice Tischner, a defense witness, testified that 
the defendant performed a "cranial" on Mrs. Marshall, and 
referred to his usual practice of taking hold of the head and 
pulling on it and turning it from side to side (T. 37, 40). 
These acts, alone, are sufficient to constitute the practice of 
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medicine. Acts of adjustment to various parts of the body, 
particularly to the spine, constitute chiropractic, which 
requires licensure. Shober v. Industrial Commission, 92 Utah 
399, 68 P.2d 757 (1937); State v. Erickson, 47 Utah 452, 154 P. 
948 (Utah 1916). 
Mr. and Mrs. Marshall, and Mrs. Tischner testified that 
defendant performed some type of accupressure on Mrs. Marshall to 
relieve either a headache or the pain from her twisted neck (T. 
37, 45, 17). The trial court found that the few times that 
these facts were disputed, Mr. and Mrs. Marshall's testimony 
appeared most credible to him (T. 61). However unorthodox his 
methods were, defendant's actions constituted "treatment" within 
the meaning of the statute. 
Not only did defendant treat Mrs. Marshall, he also 
"advised" her. He suggested that she alter her diet and avoid 
certain types of foods (T. 18). Defendant prescribed a "green 
drink" consisting of vegetables, pineapple juice, and cayenne 
pepper (T. 18). Finally, he recommended that she use garlic 
enemas (T. 23). None of these facts were controverted at trial. 
Defendant's acts constitute "advising" within the meaning of the 
statute. 
Further, defendant maintained an office, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-28(4)(b) for the purpose of engaging in 
the practice of medicine. 
As the trial court correctly concluded, the only 
exception contained in subsections (1) through (11) of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-12-30 that might even possibly apply to defendant is 
-16-
subsection (5). This subsection provides an exception to the 
licensure requirement to an "individual administering a domestic 
or family remedy including those persons engaged in the sale of 
vitamins, health food or health food supplements, herb or other 
products of nature, except drugs or medicines for which an 
authorized prescription is required by law . . . ." Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-12-30(5) (Supp. 1988). Defendant claims in his third 
point that the Medical Practice Act does not apply to persons who 
practice the "healing arts." As set forth above, defendant's 
acts went far beyond the acts allowed by the exception in 
subsection (5), and therefore this argument is without merit. 
Defendant's conviction is supported by abundant 
evidence. He diagnosed, treated, and advised Mrs. Marshall 
within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-28(2) and (4). Thus 
he engaged in the practice of medicine, for which he did not have 
a license. The evidence placed defendant squarely within the 
prohibition of Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-30. The trial court 
extensively detailed the facts upon which it based its verdict 
(T. 62-66). Defendant's assertion of insufficiency of evidence 
is unfounded, and his conviction should therefore be affirmed. 
POINT III 
THE STATE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO AFFIRMATIVELY 
PROVE THAT DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT DID NOT FALL 
WITHIN EACH OF THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE 
LICENSURE REQUIREMENT. REGARDLESS, THE 
EXCEPTIONS DO NOT APPLY. 
Defendant argues that his conviction under Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-12-30 (Supp. 1988) was erroneous because the state 
failed to affirmatively prove that he did not fall within any of 
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the exceptions listed in the statute. Specifically, defendant 
claims that the state was required to prove that he was not 
exempt from prosecution under §§ 58-12-30(4), (5) and (6). 
Defendant also argues that he was, in fact, exempt under these 
subsections of the statute, which exempt the following persons: 
(4) any individual rendering aid in an 
emergency, when no fee or other consideration 
of value for the service is contemplated, 
charged or received; 
(5) any individual administering a domestic 
or family remedy including those persons 
engaged in the sale of vitamins, health food 
or health food supplements, herb or other 
products of nature, except drugs or medicines 
for which an authorized prescription is 
required by law; 
(6) a person engaged in good faith in the 
practice of the religious tenets of any 
church or religious belief without the use of 
any drugs or medicines for which an 
authorized prescription is required by law. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-12-30(4), (5) & (6) (Supp. 1988). 
These subsections were enacted by the legislature as 
affirmative defenses to the crime enumerated in the statute. An 
affirmative defense is one that does not deny the acts charged, 
but seeks instead to justify or excuse the actor despite his 
behavior. See United States v. Parr, 516 F.2d 458, 466 (5th Cir. 
1975). 
Defendant's argument is based on the mistaken premise 
that the state carries the burden of disproving all potential 
affirmative defenses in a criminal prosecution. The United 
States Supreme Court has determined that due process requires the 
state to prove "every fact necessary to constitute the crime with 
which [the defendant] is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 
364 (1970). But n[p]roof of the nonexistence of an affirmative 
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defense is not constitutionally required." See State v. Cox, 751 
P.2d 1152, 1154 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citing Patterson v. New 
York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977)). 
Defendant offers no authority in support of his 
assertion that the state was required to disprove the exemptions 
provided in the statute. Further, defendant did not argue that 
he qualified for exemption at trial; he is, therefore, precluded 
from raising the argument on appeal. State v. Chancellor, 704 
P.2d 579, 580 (Utah 1985). Even if these claims had been 
properly preserved for appeal, they are not supported by the 
evidence. 
Defendant claims that he qualified for exemption under 
§ 58-12-30(4) because he was "rendering aid in an emergency" and 
was not paid for his services. Defendant points to the fact that 
he interrupted his vacation at Snowbird for "the express purpose 
of meeting with the complainant" (Appellant's Opening Brief at 
14). He contends that this is evidence of an emergency. 
However, Deryl Tischner, a defense witness, testified that the 
defendant interrupted his vacation because Mr. and Mrs. Marshall 
could not otherwise make arrangements to visit defendant, so he 
accommodated them by returning from Snowbird. (T. 32). The 
record does not support defendant's claim that he was "rendering 
aid in an emergency." 
Defendant also claims that he qualified for exemption 
under § 58-12-30(5) which excuses individuals administering 
"domestic or family remedies." Defendant relies on State v. Yee 
Foo Lun, 45 Utah 531, 147 P. 488, 491 (1915), for a definition of 
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"domestic medicines:" 
Such substances as are commonly kept by 
nonprofessional persons in their own homes 
for use as remedies in the absence of a 
physician, being necessarily substances the 
effect of which is a matter of general 
knowledge, so that no special training is 
required for their safe administration. 
(Citations omitted.) 
This definition does not assist defendant. Nothing in 
the record or in common experience suggests that "the effect" of 
defendant's "garlic enema," or "green drink," is a matter of 
general knowledge. As the court in Yee Foo Lun observed 
regarding a mixture of ginseng, licorice, cinnamon and 
sasparilla: "Such a compound or concoction is not something 
commonly kept by nonprofessional persons in their homes, or of 
which they have general knowledge." :id. at 491. "That such a 
mixture is free from alcohol, chloroform, narcotic or alkaloidal 
drugs, and probably harmless, is not the controlling factor." 
Id. Neither the defendant's green drink nor garlic enema was a 
"domestic or family remedy" within the meaning of the statute. 
Regardless, defendant's acts went far beyond the 
prescription of the green drink and garlic enema. As set forth 
above, defendant engaged in acts of abdominal examination and 
spinal manipulation and made conclusions about Mrs. Marshall's 
pancreas and infected sinuses. Thus, subsection (5) does not 
except him from criminal responsibility. 
Defendant also claims that he qualified for exemption 
from prosecution by § 58-12-30(6), which excuses persons engaged 
in good faith in the practice of any religious tenet. There is 
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no evidence in the record concerning defendant's religious 
beliefs or a religious basis for his actions. Defendant's 
attempts to supplement the record with references to his 
religious status cannot be countenanced by this Court. Because 
the record does not support his claims, they should be 
disregarded. Utah R. App. P. 24(7); Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 
746 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
The state was not required to affirmatively disprove 
the potential exemptions contained in Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-12-
30(4), (5) & (6). See State v. Cox, 751 P.2d 1152, 1153 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988); Reams v. State, 279 So. 2d 839, 843 (Fla. 1973) 
(under Florida Medical Practice Act, defendant must raise and 
prove exemptions under the Act). Even so, the trial judge 
indicated that he had considered the possible exemptions and 
found them inapplicable (T. 64-66). Nothing in the record 
suggests that defendant would have qualified for any of the 
exemptions provided by the statute. Defendant's conviction 
should therefore be affirmed. 
POINT IV 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-12-30, WHICH PROHIBITS 
PRACTICING MEDICINE WITHOUT A LICENSE, IS 
NEITHER UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD NOR 
VAGUE. 
Defendant asserts that it is understandable that he 
would be asked to share his gifts with those who are suffering 
and that his acts do not constitute practicing medicine. In the 
alternative, without legal support, he asserts that if his acts 
do constitute practicing medicine, the statute is overly broad 
and vague. 
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Defendant has not cited to any legal authority to 
support his argument that the statute is unconstitutionally 
overbroad or unclear. For this reason, his argument should not 
be considered by this Court, Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9)• 
Regardless, the statute, Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-30 
(Supp. 1988), withstands constitutional scrutiny. Defendant's 
argument appears to be that the language in the statute is overly 
broad because it may prohibit acts that are constitutionally 
permissible. He points to various acts he claims to have engaged 
in and asserts they do not constitute practicing medicine. 
"Legislative enactments are accorded a presumption of 
validity. In considering a challenge to the overbreadth of a 
law, the law must be shown to reach a substantial amount of 
constitutionally protected conduct. If it does not, the 
challenge will fail." State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502, 505 (Utah 
1987). In Hoffman, the defendant was convicted of practicing 
medicine without a license for having attempted to diagnose and 
treat stomach pains as "chemical poisoning, stomach ulcers, and 
'negative energies.'" Id. at 504. He prescribed pain killer 
pills, celestial water, and special pillows as treatments for the 
maladies. Ici. He claimed on appeal that the provision of the 
Code which defines the practice of medicine was fatally vague and 
overbroad. 
As in the present case, Hoffman failed to distinguish 
the concept of vagueness from the concept of overbreadth and only 
argued the latter. The Court held that defendant's conduct in 
purporting to diagnose maladies and prescribe treatments like 
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"celestial water" was not constitutionally protected conduct; he 
was not engaging in a constitutionally protected activity. Id. 
at 505. Because his conduct was prohibited by the statute, he 
could "not be heard to complain that the statute is overbroad so 
as to prohibit conduct that is not applicable to the facts of his 
case. Having engaged in conduct not constitutionally protected, 
defendant is not entitled to assert a constitutional claim that 
might be argued by someone else who prescribes domestic or family 
remedies." Ld. at 505-06, citing People v. Jeffers, 690 P.2d 
194, 194 (Colo. 1984); State v. Baker, 229 N.C. 73, 48 S.E.2d 61, 
67 (1948). 
The facts of the present case are remarkably similar to 
the facts in Hoffman. As in Hoffman, defendant's conduct is not 
constitutionally protected. He, therefore, is not entitled to 
assert a claim in this case that the statute is unconstitu-
tionally overbroad. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING 
EVIDENCE OF THE SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES OF 
THE TREATMENT PROVIDED BY DEFENDANT. 
Defendant claims that, because causing pain is not an 
element of the charge, the trial court erred in admitting 
evidence concerning Mrs. Marshall's pain and subsequent 
operation. He also claims that Mr. Fairhurst, the keeper of the 
records at Occupational and Professional Licensing, was not 
qualified to testify that he was not licensed to practice 
medicine. This aspect of the argument can be summarily disposed 
of; Mr. Fairhurst was qualified as the keeper of the records, 
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reviewed the records, and found that defendant was not licensed 
to practice medicine (T. 8-9)• 
Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that all 
relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by 
constitutional provision, statute or rule. Mrs. Marshall 
testified that she experienced pain after being treated by 
defendant (T. 19). Paul Jacobsen, a physical therapist, 
testified that Mrs. Marshall came to see him, complaining of 
pain, after having had her neck "twisted by a doctor in Salt 
Lake" (T. 26). He did not treat her, but rather referred her to 
two physicians, one of whom was Dr. Gaufin (T. 26). Dr. Gaufin 
testified that he performed surgery on Mrs. Marshall for a 
herniated cervical disc between the fifth and sixth vertebrae (T. 
29). The injury was in close proximity to a prior surgical 
fusion (T. 30). Defendant objected to the statement made by Mrs. 
Marshall to Paul Jacobsen based upon grounds of hearsay, but did 
not otherwise object to the testimony. The court sustained the 
hearsay objection. Because defendant did not object to the 
testimony of either Jacobsen or Gaufin on grounds that it was 
inflammatory, his argument cannot be heard on appeal. State v. 
Chancellor, 704 P.2d 579 (Utah 1985). 
There is no question that causing pain is not an 
element of the offense. However, the testimony was relevant, 
albeit not essential, to corroborate Mrs. Marshall's testimony. 
The trial court has considerable discretion in deciding whether 
evidence is relevant. Bambrouqh v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286 (Utah 
1986). The trial court should not be reversed absent a showing 
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by a defendant that the court abused its discretion. Terry v. 
Zions Corp. Mercantile Inst.# 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), overruled 
on other grounds, McFarland v. Skaggs, Co., Inc.# 678 P.2d 298 
(Utah 1984). Because in a bench trial a judge is less likely to 
be influenced by inflammatory evidence than might be the case in 
a jury trial, the trial court is given even more discretion in 
this area. See State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 407 (Utah 1989). 
Defendant has not established that the court abused its 
discretion. 
POINT VI 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING HIS 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its 
discretion by denying his motion for a new trial because he was 
untrained in the law and, therefore, he was "railroaded" in this 
case (Appellant's Opening Brief at 26). He also claims as a 
basis for his motion that, had the trial court granted his 
request, the state would have been spared the expense of 
prosecuting this appeal. Id. Defendant cites no legal authority 
in support of his argument, but rather indicates that the court 
abused its discretion. 
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides 
that the court may "grant a new trial in the interest of justice 
if there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial 
adverse effect upon the rights of a party." Whether to grant a 
motion for new trial is within the discretion of the trial court 
and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly appears 
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that the trial court abused its discretion and that the defendant 
was prejudiced. State v. Smith, 777 P.2d 464 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
Defendant voluntarily chose to represent himself at 
trial. Having knowingly made the decision, despite the urging of 
the court to obtain counsel, he cannnot now be heard to complain 
on this basis. He has chosen to represent himself in this 
appeal. If he does not prevail, he could again claim that he has 
been "railroaded" and is entitled to further relief. Defendant 
has not established that the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying his motion for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant was properly convicted of practicing medicine 
without a license. For the foregoing reasons, as well as any 
additional reasons advanced at oral argument, the State of Utah 
respectfully requests that this Court affirm defendant's 
conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^ day of August, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
I ^RBARA BEARNSOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
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